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NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
7/2/03.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED , 7/2/03.

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

November 12, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, November 12, 1962, 11:00 AM Meeting No. 24

- 1. The President asked about the state of readiness of U.S. forces. General Taylor replied that DefCon 2 is still in effect. Secretary McNamara said he would raise with the President later this week whether the existing SAC alert should be modified and whether the reserve air defense units called up last month should be released.
- 2. Director McCone presented a summary of current intelligence and called attention to a special estimate of Castro's subversive capability in Latin America.
- 3. Secretary Rusk reported and ad been no charmain the political situation over the week end, and as yet, no new Soviet position with respect to withdrawing IL-28 to theirs from Cuba nor any report on the Castro-Mikovan negotiations an Havana.
- 4. Ambassador Stevenson reported on the deadlocked negotiation, with the Russians in New York. He recommended that our final position be presented to them promptly in a package which they could accept or reject, thereby advancing or bringing to an end discussion of this part of the Cuban crisis.
- 5. The President asked that recommendations as to our next political move be made to him later this afternoon.
- 6. There was a discussion of the form of an assurance against a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The President asked that the assurance should not be referred to as a guarantee and that it not be made to appear as a new undertaking but rather a restatement of undertakings in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.
- 7. The President asked that a press statement be prepared for discussion later this afternoon which would summarize the current situation. A decision was made later not to issue a statement.)

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- 8. The President directed Mr. McCone to arrange that so far as possible every refugee making a public statement about offensive missiles in Cuba should be promptly asked to give the source of his information. All useful information obtained in this way should of course be promptly followed up, but when a refugee is unable to give any significant substantiating information, the President directed that news media giving substantial attention to such statements should be advised privately of the irresponsible character of the report to which they were giving circulation. The President further directed Mr. McCone to seek means of encouraging responsible news media to check the reliability of refugee reports before giving them wide circulation.
- 9. There was a general discussion of the importance of establishing arrangements which would reassure the American people and our Latin American allies that Soviet offensive weapons cannot be suddenly and secretly introduced into Cuba.

Information Burdy
McGeorge Bundy

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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to tem 8, but
Think we should have
an Afetin Mamo on it
as mary war

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